Names | Sandworm Team (Trend Micro) Iron Viking (SecureWorks) CTG-7263 (SecureWorks) Voodoo Bear (CrowdStrike) Quedagh (F-Secure) TEMP.Noble (FireEye) ATK 14 (Thales) BE2 (Kaspersky) | |
Country | ![]() | |
Sponsor | State-sponsored | |
Motivation | Sabotage and destruction | |
First seen | 2009 | |
Description | Sandworm Team is a Russian cyberespionage group that has operated since approximately 2009. The group likely consists of Russian pro-hacktivists. Sandworm Team targets mainly Ukrainian entities associated with energy, industrial control systems, SCADA, government, and media. Sandworm Team has been linked to the Ukrainian energy sector attack in late 2015. This group appears to be closely associated with, or evolved into, TeleBots. | |
Observed | Sectors: Education, Energy, Government, Telecommunications. Countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Ukraine. | |
Tools used | BlackEnergy, Gcat, PassKillDisk, PsList. | |
Operations performed | Oct 2014 | The vulnerability was disclosed by iSIGHT Partners, which said that the vulnerability had already been exploited in a small number of cyberespionage attacks against NATO, several unnamed Ukrainian government organizations, a number of Western European governmental organizations, companies operating in the energy sector, European telecoms firms, and a US academic organization. <https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sandworm-windows-zero-day-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-targeted-attacks> |
Dec 2015 | Widespread power outages on the Ukraine The power outage was described as technical failures taking place on Wednesday, December 23 that impacted a region around Ivano-Frankivisk Oblast. One report suggested the utility began to disconnect power substations for no apparent reason. The same report goes on to describe a virus was launched from the outside and it brought down the “remote management system” (a reference to the SCADA and or EMS). The outage was reported to have lasted six hours before electrical service was restored. At least two reports suggest the utility had initiated manual controls for restoration of service and the SCADA system was still off-line due to the infection. <https://ics.sans.org/blog/2015/12/30/current-reporting-on-the-cyber-attack-in-ukraine-resulting-in-power-outage> | |
Aug 2019 | Russian military cyber actors, publicly known as Sandworm Team, have been exploiting a vulnerability in Exim mail transfer agent (MTA) software since at least last August. <https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/2196511/exim-mail-transfer-agent-actively-exploited-by-russian-gru-cyber-actors/> | |
Counter operations | Oct 2020 | Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and> |
Information | <https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/timeline-of-sandworm-attacks/> <https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/> <https://securelist.com/be2-custom-plugins-router-abuse-and-target-profiles/67353/> | |
MITRE ATT&CK | <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/> |
Last change to this card: 07 January 2021
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